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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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
- 2. USSR-UN: Contrary to previous report, Gromyko will attend resumed General Assembly session in March. (Page 11)
- 3. Mali: Bloc offers to purchase entire 1960-61 peanut crop. (Page 11)
- 5. Israel Arab States: Forthcoming Israeli test mobilization may be used by Nasir as occasion to denounce Israel. (Page ttt)
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
Mali

In the five months of its existence Mali has established diplomatic relations with six bloc countries, including the USSR and Communist China, received a large number of visiting bloc delegations, and sent a number of special missions to bloc countries. Except for one rather vague economic agreement with Czechoslovakia signed last November, these contacts have so far produced few overt results. Nevertheless, the way seems to be open for the bloc to penetrate Mali as it has done in neighboring Guinea. The USSR is known to have been developing a comprehensive plan for the industrial development of Mali, while the Czechs have evinced interest in Mali's civil aviation, industrial development, and geological surveys. Malian Minister of Commerce Ndouré stated last week that he was "inundated" with bloc economic proposals, adding that he was under heavy political pressure to accept such offers without delay.

Mali's Marxist-influenced one-party regime is moving to reduce French influence. The regime, motivated by a militant anticolonialism, considers such a reduction a necessary prerequisite to the attainment of its proclaimed goal of 'total' political and economic independence. At the same time Malians continue to resent the part they believe French elements played in neighboring Senegal's secession from its former federation with Mali last summer. After finally accepting the federation's demise, Mali's leaders declared their country's dissociation from the French Community and began to institute measures aimed at undercutting French commercial interests.

	ting French commercial interests.
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25X6	Regime spokes- men have left little doubt that further moves to reduce French influenceespecially in the economic sphere would be forthcoming. A decision to shift the bulk of Mali's

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High Soviet Official Dismissed for Agriculture Failures

Khrushchev showed strong dissatisfaction with the condition of Ukrainian agriculture early in the central committee meeting in mid-January when he interrupted the speech of Ukrainian party chief Podgorny, a member of the ruling party presidium, with sharp criticism. The first sign that Kalchenko was personally in trouble, came only a few days later when Khrushchev, in his own speech, accused the Ukrainian Premier of panicking with disastrous results, during a drought in 1956. 'There he sits,' said Khrushchev, 'a member of the central committee and everything rolls off him as water does off a duck's back. It doesn't matter to him that he made a mistake.'

Vladimir Matskevich, like Kalchenko a former subordinate of Khrushchev's in the Ukraine, was fired as Soviet agriculture minister in December. Their ousters and Podgorny's precarious position are further signs that the Ukraine and Khrushchev's old associates can no longer expect special treatment from Moscow

The new premier, Vladimir Shcherbitsky has been a secretary of the Ukrainian party organization since late 1957, specializing in industrial matters. He is one of several younger party administrators who have been brought recently into prominence. A party member only since World War II, Shcherbitsky got started in the Ukrainian party organization during the early 1950's and became party boss in the industrial center of Dnepropetrovsk in 1954. He attracted the attention of the Moscow leadership, and was given a seat on the party's Central Auditing Commission at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in 1956.

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The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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